We can say that there are three main classes of views about conscious experience. Type-A views hold that consciousness, insofar as it exists, supervenes logically on the physical, for broadly functionalist or eliminativist reasons. Type-B views accept that consciousness is not logically supervenient, holding that there is no a priori implication from the physicalism to the phenomenal, but maintain materialism all the same. Type-C views deny both logical supervenience and materialism.

Type-C views include various kinds of property dualism. In his double-aspect theory of information, David Chalmers, whose view includes the latter, claims that information possesses two aspects: Physical and phenomenal. Whenever we find an information space realized phenomenally, we find the same information space realized physically.

The aim of my project is to add a principle, called Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle, to the double-aspect theory of information, holding that the principle can grant the double-aspect theory a strong explanatory and predictive power. The principle is also supposed to make Chalmers' theory quantitative so that, given any information space, we can calculate the probability of realization of physical and phenomenal.