What can empirical studies tell us about free will? By looking at the literature, one could get the idea that there are only two ways to answer this question: (1) Free will is clearly identified by the empirical sciences as being a mere illusion, or (2) empirical studies do not and never will tell us anything about free will. This thesis argues for a view that lies in the middle. First, I will argue that self-control – conceptualized as the influence of conscious deliberations on decisions – is a necessary condition for free will. Second, from the perspective of self-control, I will discuss findings from neuropsychology, cognitive psychology, and social psychology. It will turn out that no experiment is able to deny, on a stable empirical basis, that we usually have self-control when we think we do. However, especially social psychological studies strongly suggest that we should keep a healthy dose of skepticism with regard to our trust in free will. The claim that there can never be a study which clearly speaks against free will seems to be premature.